We examine how charitable giving is influenced by who in the household is primarily responsible for giving decisions. Looking first at single-person households, we find men and women to have significantly different tastes for giving, setting up a potential conflict for married couples. We find that, with respect to total giving, married households tend to resolve these conflicts largely in favor of the husband's preferences. Bargaining over charitable giving, rather than letting one spouse take charge, reduces giving by about six percent. When the woman is the decision maker, she will still make a significantly different allocation of those charity dollars, preferring to give to more charities but to give less to each. Our results give new insights into both the demographics of charitable giving and the costliness of household bargaining.
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I. Introduction
Married couples make joint earning and spending decisions, they allocate goods and tasks within the home, they settle disagreements, and produce household public goods. It is important for economists to ask how these decisions are made, and how economic variables affect the household dynamics. However, the literature on intra-household decision making has been constrained by the difficulty of identifying, within consumption surveys, household consumption items that are clearly private goods for only one spouse, or clearly public goods for the household. From those studies that have identified husband's goods (e.g. husband's leisure, men's clothing), wife's goods (e.g. wife's leisure, women's clothing) and public goods (e.g. children's clothing, children's nutrition), one consensus has emerged --households are typically not governed by a sole benevolent head, as hypothesized by Becker (1981) , but are better characterized by bargaining between spouses with different tastes and talents. 1 Still, much more remains to be learned about how households make decisions and how compromises are formed.
One good that is usually a public good in the household is the family's charitable giving.
The average household gives between one and two percent of income to charity annually.
Economists have long been concerned about how sensitive giving is to income and to the tax deduction for charity, and how these variables may affect the total amount of charity and the distribution of dollars across types of charities. However, research has not taken into account the view that bargaining may characterize household decisions. In addition, there is growing evidence that men's and women's tastes for giving could be quite different. For instance, Eller (1997) reports that women and men differ dramatically in their estate giving, while experimental research finds significant difference in how men's and women's giving responds to price and income. 2 If indeed men and women have different views on philanthropy, how are these conflicts resolved within a household?
This paper explores a unique survey designed to learn about charitable giving, but which contains a question about who in the household is the primary decision maker on charity. We draw on theories of intra-household resource allocation to frame an empirical investigation of the role of intra-household bargaining on the household's charitable giving. In the next section we discuss a theoretical framework for approaching the problem. In Section III, we describe our data. In Section IV we present evidence that single men and women do indeed have significantly different tastes for giving. Section V turns to couples and estimates the impact of bargaining on the level of charitable donations. We show that bargaining does indeed reduce giving, and that bargaining agreements predominantly favor men. Section VI explores the endogeneity of who decides on charitable giving. As expected, we find that relative education and income are the primary determinants. Conclusions are in Section VII. Alderman, et al. (1995) makes a case to favor a bargaining approach. 2 Eller (1997) reports 37.6 percent of bequests3 to charity by men went to private foundations, while only 18.7 of that of women did. Women gave 14.3 percent of their estates to religious organizations, in contrast to 5.4 percent by men. Educational, medical, and scientific organizations drew 34.5 percent of women's charitable bequests but only 21.5 percent of men's. The differences overall level of philanthropy were much smaller: male donors contributed 26.7 percent of their net worth, compared to 27.6 for women. In a controlled experiment, Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) found that men are significantly more price elastic than women, and that women are more "equalitarian." 3 Marriage allows two adults to share in several marriage-specific public goods, including charitable giving. Marriage may also require that persons with distinct preferences devote resources to negotiating expenditure patterns, and this too extends to charitable donations. In this section, we present a simple model to illustrate the effects of conflict in preferences between members of a couple on their charitable giving, and discuss how bargaining costs may discourage donations when tastes differ across partners.
II. How Does Bargaining Within Marriage Affect Charitable Giving?
To see how giving within marriage depends on the alignment of preferences, consider the case of two nearly-identical persons with two charitable options. Except for their preferences over the two charities, these persons are identical. In particular, this husband and wife have the same income and bargaining power, but have utility functions
Each person receives utility from his/her own consumption of private goods c i , from a marriagespecific public good g, and from donations to two causes d 1 and d 2 . As single persons we assume they have identical levels of utility, and we assume that in marriage they will costlessly agree to an expenditure pattern that is Pareto efficient and yields equal utility for each partner.
Consider as a benchmark the case in which each person cares about only one of the two options, so that θ h (d 1 , d 2 )=d 1 and θ w (d 1 , d 2 )=d 2 . In this case donations are private goods within the marriage. Since the two persons now share the cost of the public good g, the household economies free up resources for other expenditures. If the donations are normal goods, then marriage will lead each person to donate more than he or she would as a single person.
Next consider a couple whose preferences are identical rather than orthogonal. Suppose that each cares only about d 1 so that θ h (d 1 , d 2 )= θ w (d 1 , d 2 )=d 1 . Each dollar donated now brings 4 satisfaction to both partners, making donations a public good in the household. However, if as single individuals each would have given d 1 *, as a couple their donations may actually be more or less than 2d 1 *. If there are no household economies in providing g, and assuming private consumption is a normal good, it follows from Samuelson efficiency conditions that giving by the couple will be above d 1 * but below 2d 1 *. If the economies gained by forming the new household are significant, however, then this "income effect" will push giving up, perhaps even above 2d 1 *. Still, compared to the orthogonal case in the prior paragraph, this household will spend less in total on giving. The reason, obviously, is that donations are now jointly consumed. Married individuals, of course, typically choose each other, and evidence suggests mating is assortative across measurable characteristics such as education (see for example Pencavel 1998) . It is thus likely that two married individuals have greater similarity on tastes for giving then any couple formed at random. But unless tastes are identical a couple may bargain over the dispensation of charitable dollars, and this bargaining can be costly. The cost can be inframarginal (deciding whether or not to give) or marginal (deciding how much to give), and costs at the margin may be increasing (you have to argue harder for the last few dollars given).
Both types of costs should work to further diminish a household's contribution to charity.
There are also some couples that don't get along well enough to reach a bargaining solution in the first place. These may be in the "separate-spheres" outcome described by Lundberg and Pollak (1993) . In this case, couples choose not to divorce and sacrifice the household economies of scale, but the allocations within the marriage are characterized by a noncooperative Nash equilibrium in which both partners make giving decisions, each independently. Whether the Nash-bargained level of giving is higher or lower than giving by the couple that bargains efficiently will depend on the alignment of tastes across charities. In particular, the noncooperative equilibrium will supply less of marriage-specific public goods (including donations to charities both spouses enjoy) and more of the private goods (including donations to charities only one spouse enjoys).
One way to test the effect of bargaining costs on giving is to look at choices of households in which one spouse cedes charitable decision-making authority to the other. Even if prior bargaining determined who would be the decision-maker, single-person decision-making suggests that there is not much bargaining going on at the margin that would drive up the price of donations. Among couples who make decisions jointly, giving may be restrained at the margin by the costliness of reaching agreement.
The interest in this question, of course, rests on husbands and wives differing in their tastes for giving. Accordingly, we begin by exploring the giving patterns for single men and single women to see if they differ significantly by gender. Before turning to these results, we describe our data set.
III. The Data
We use household surveys conducted in 1992 and 1994 by the Gallup Organization, and commissioned by Independent Sector, which were designed to measure giving and volunteering behaviors. These two independent cross sections were randomly drawn from the United States, 6 and surveys were conducted in person with one adult member of the household. Both surveys include a question on who within the household allocates money to charities; the question is worded, "Who in your household is considered most involved in deciding which charities your household will give to?" The responses to this question are central to our analysis.
Pooling the 1992 and 1994 data gives a sample of 4180 households. Among married couples, 53 percent report that decisions about charitable giving are made jointly, 19 percent say the husband is most involved in deciding, and 28 percent respond that the wife is the primary decision-maker. Table A1 in the appendix provides detailed definitions of key variables, while other tables and summary statistics are available from the authors.
Because of the charitable deduction for households that itemize deductions on the personal income tax, it will often cost a household less than a dollar for each dollar given away.
For example, a household in the 31 percent marginal tax bracket that itemizes faces a tax price of 69 cents for each dollar donated. For a household that does not itemize, however, the price remains one. 7 members, gross income, probable filing status, and the tax schedules for the relevant year. Our final sample includes 3,045 households with the information needed for this calculation. We first look for gender differences in the decision to give. The first two columns of Table 1 contain the results of the probit estimation of the probability of making a charitable donation for each sex. As expected, the price variable has a negative effect for both single men and single women. The coefficient on the income variable is positive for both, but is statistically significant only for single men. The dummy variables for education have significant positive effects for both. Comparing these two equations, we find that the behavior of males and females is, in fact, significantly different. The hypothesis that they behave identically can be rejected at the 0.10 level of significance (χ 2 (12) = 19.69, p-value=.073).
Turn next to the levels of contributions. In our analysis, as in much of the literature, the dependent variable is the logarithm of the dollar amount of contributions.
8
Because 31 percent of our sample reported no contributions, we estimate the giving functions with a tobit specification (censored at zero). The results of the estimation are presented in the third and fourth columns of Table 1 . As expected, the tax price has a negative effect in both equations, and the effect is significant for single males. Income has a positive and significant effect in both equations. As is common in the literature on charitable giving, age and education variables tend to have positive and significant coefficients. As with the probability equations, the hypothesis that the equations for amount given are the same for single men and single women is rejected, 8 here at a .05 level of confidence (χ 2 (12) = 21.30, p-value = .046). Hence, we can confidently say that, overall, single men and women display different tendencies toward giving.
V. Married Couples: What Differences Remain?
The possibility of assortative mating suggests that differences found between single people will exaggerate the expected differences between married individuals. If preferences for charity constitute a main criterion in spousal selection, or are correlated with the main criteria, then we may see no significant differences been male and females in married couples.
We address this possibility by classifying couples according to the three assignments of decision-making authority of charitable donations: the husband decides, the wife decides, and they make decisions jointly. Note that couples can differ in three ways: whether they give, how much they give, and to what types of organizations they give. We will explore gender differences within the marriage for all three dimensions of giving. Table 3 reports the probit equations estimating the likelihood of making a gift. We estimate separate equations for each type of couple: husband-decides, wife-decides, and jointdeciders. As expected, the tax price has a negative effect and income a positive effect in all three equations, although income is significant only for joint deciders. Looking at the effect of education, a noteworthy pattern appears. In the husband-decides equation the husband's educational variables are positive and significant, as expected, but the educational variables for the wife are insignificant. Likewise, in the wife-decides equation the wife's educational variables are postive and (mostly) significant, while the husband's are not. For joint-deciders, 9 however, only the educational variables for the husband are positive and significant. These results strongly suggest of a model of bargaining, rather than unitary and altruistic decision making.
The tobit estimates of the amount-given equations, shown in the last three columns of Table 2 , show a similar pattern. Again, the tax price effects are negative, and the effect of income is positive and significant in all three equations. And as we saw in the likelihood-ofgiving equations, only the decision maker's own educational attainment is significant in the regressions, and when couples decide jointly only the husband's education is significant.
As with singles, we ask whether these gender differences are significant. For each set of regressions we conducted tests across all pairings of the equations. Interestingly, the only significant difference occurs when comparing joint-deciding households to wife-deciding households. Moreover, this difference was found for both the probability-of-giving (χ This is particularly striking in light of the fact that there was no significant difference between married males and married females, nor between married males and couples for either the probability-or amount-of-giving equations. This result suggests that jointly deciding couples behave differently from males and from females-even though male and female deciders themselves are not significantly different from each other-and that the compromise behavior is especially far from the choices of female deciders.
Next we turn to the question of how gifts are distributed across the different types of charities. Our data allow us to look at the distribution across twelve different functional categories of charitable activity. Here we will see the gender difference again growing larger.
Looking at the means across these twelve areas of charitable activity, an interesting pattern emerges.
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Among single people, women are more likely than men to give to every single category of charity except one-adult-recreation. Among married people, women more likely than men to give to all but two categories-adult-recreation and public-benefit. Looking at levels of giving, women also seem to spread their giving dollars more thinly than men, while men appear to have a greater tendency to concentrate their giving. Are these differences significant?
To answer this question, we constructed a test based on a Herfindahl index of the concentration of giving. The Herfindahl index equals one if the household gives to only one type of organization, such as religious groups, while if dollars are spread evenly among all twelve types of organizations the index will reach its lower bound, which in our case is 0.083. The average value of the Herfindahl index for married couples with a male decision maker is 0.64, with a female decision maker is 0.59 and for couples deciding jointly is 0.63. Tests reveal that indeed married male decision makers concentrate their giving significantly more than married female decision makers. However, when couples decide jointly, the concentration is not significantly different from when males decide alone, but is significantly different from when females decide. 10 Notice, this is the same pattern seen in the giving equations.
How does this difference manifest itself across charities? In Table 3 we present predicted values for the probability and magnitude of gifts for the twelve areas for a representative household. The table shows predictions for a white, church-going family of three, headed by two adults who are high school graduates. The family's income is $39,785 and the family faces a 11 charity price of 0.85. The husband is 45 years old and the wife is 43.
The table reveals several interesting differences. Panel A shows that married women are significantly more likely to give to health and education than are either married men or jointlydeciding couples, and husbands are significantly more likely to give to adult recreation than are couples. Jointly-deciding couples, however, generally look more like husbands than wives, with one exception -husbands are significantly more likely to give charity than couples.
Panel B shows another interesting difference in amounts given. Females give much more to Health and Human Services than couples and, regardless of who decides, religious organizations constitute the category that receives the greatest level of support. But as before, couples deciding jointly seem to look more like males than females.
Since the predictions in Table 3 are made for a particular household, it raises the question of whether similar differences are found as we change key variables, such as the price of giving. Figure 1 shows predictions for the median household over a variety of prices. At the price of 0.69 we would predict that married men would give more than married women. As the price of giving rises the difference vanishes, and when the price is unity females are giving more than males-a result that is strikingly similar to experimental findings (Andreoni and Vesterlund 2001) . We can also ask whether the composition of giving also changes with price. A simple way to characterize this is by separating religious giving from all giving. Figure 1 shows that differences in religious contributions account for 64% of the difference in male and female giving at the price of 0.69, but is responsible for over 100% of the difference at prices 0.72 and 0.85. This indicates that as the price rises, the marital differences over the composition of giving appear more extreme.
V. Joint Decision Making: Does Bargaining Depress Giving?
We have now shown that many of the differences identified with single people carry over to married couples. Household decision making, therefore, seems more consistent with bargaining than with maximizing a single household utility function. In this section, we look more closely at this bargaining interpretation of our data. Looking at the amount given to charity by couples who decide jointly, we estimate their choice as a linear combination of the amount the husband would choose, were he in charge, and the amount the wife would choose were she in charge.
Let X m and X f be the characteristics of males and females, including household income, price of giving, own age and own education, but excluding spouse's age and education. Define the vectors B m and B f as ordinary regression coefficients, and let a m and a f be scalars. Then let I m be an indicator variable equal to one if the male is primary charity decision maker, and let I f and I c equal one when the female or couple is the decider, respectively. Finally, let G be the level of charitable giving by the household. Then consider the regression equation
where e is a random error term with a zero mean. When the male is the decider B X = G m m mˆ will serve as the predicted gift, and when the female is the decider it is B X = G f f fˆ. However, when the couple makes the decision the prediction is
The scalars a m and a f then tell us about how the couple's decision is influenced by the desires of 13 both its members.
An important aspect of this formulation is that we do not constrain the scalars a m and a f in any way. For instance, if a m and a f sum to one then this would imply that in making a joint decision the household neither creates nor destroys any dollars of charity. By contrast, if a m and a f sum to more than one, then extra charity is created. This would imply some increasing return to joint decisions, such as complementary expertise in identifying efficient charities, or through information-sharing that leads at least one spouse to come to appreciate and to derive utility from the other's charitable choices. Finally, a m and a f could sum to less than one, in which case the bargaining is destroying some charity. For instance, spouses could oppose each other's charities and decide jointly in order to monitor their spouse's giving. Also, bargaining from divergent views could lead to more costly decision making, which itself leads to fewer decisions made and fewer dollars spent. Notice that because these estimates are drawn entirely from married couples, the differences cannot be due to self-selection into marriage. There may, of course, be selection into the modes of decision-making. This possibility is explored next.
VI. Who Decides?
Given the significance of who is the decision maker, it is natural to ask what factors influence the selection of decision makers. We explore this using a multinomial logistic modeling of the choice of decider, with results presented in Tables 4 and 5. The base case is that the woman decides, hence the first column of estimates gives the effect of each variable on the probability that the man decides, and the second column looks at the probability that the decision is made jointly. In Table 4 we include a dummy variable equal to one if the household reports the male is the primary earner. Since this may be endogenous to the choice of charity decision maker, Table   5 presents instrumented predictions of whether the man is expected to be the primary earner. The other variables intended to reflect human capital are relative age, measured as the man's age minus the woman's, and relative educational attainment. To control for cohort effects, we include average age and average education in the household. We also include ethnicity and churchgoing to account for culture and tastes, and we include family size as it may influence the bargaining powers and the threat-point for separate-spheres bargaining. Table 4 shows that the coefficient on who is the primary earner is large and statistically significant --if the husband is reported to be the primary earner, he is far more likely to make the giving decisions, the couple is somewhat more likely, and the wife is less likely. If being the primary earner strengthens one's bargaining power in a marriage, then this suggests that, on average, being the charity provider is a task that people seek, and that the value to being the charity decider conveys an advantage that outweighs any cost that comes with it.
We also see in Table 4 that age differences are not a significant influence on who is the decider, but educational differences are. The greater the husband's education relative to the wife's, the greater the likelihood that the husband or the couple is the decider, although couples with higher average levels of education are more likely to make joint decisions. This is consistent with the view that education is linked to bargaining power, and decision-making is a utility-providing privilege. It could also be true, however, that more educated spouses are more skilled at evaluating worthy charities. An additional finding is that in Hispanic households the male is unilaterally more likely to be reported to be the decision-maker.
To avoid having the endogenous primary-earner variable on the right-hand side, we also perform a two-stage estimation in which the first stage predicts primary earner status from age, education, occupation of head, family size, and ethnic variables, which we report in Table 5 . The key exclusion restrictions in the first stage are that the occupation of the head predicts whether the primary earner is male or female, but has no effect on who makes the charity decisions. The other exclusion restriction is that the returns to education differ by education level in the first stage but not in the second.
As before, Table 5 shows that the probability that the man is the sole decision-maker is still increasing in his educational advantage relative to his partner, and average education still increases the likelihood that decisions are made jointly. Beyond that, however, the results from 16 this table differ greatly from those in Table 4 . Increasing the likelihood that the male is the primary earner significantly increases the likelihood that either he or the couple makes the decisions, while increasing the likelihood that the female is the primary earner decreases the likelihood of her being the sole decider. Moreover, as the probability that the male is the primary earner goes to one, the probability of the male being to sole decider goes to 0.16, and that of the female goes to about 0.31. By contrast, as the probability that the female is the primary earner goes to one, the probability that she is the sole decider goes to zero and that for the couple goes to one. This suggests two things. First, the results reported in Table 4 are likely to be driven by unobserved bargaining power that leads one member of the household to be both the primary earner and the charity decision-maker. Second, it suggests an interesting dynamic in household decisions in which the male, as he loses power over the household's earnings, bargains harder to retain at least shared control over the household's decisions on charity.
VII. Summary and Conclusion
Several striking patterns pervade the analysis. First, single men and women are significantly different in their propensities to give, the amount they give, and the distributions of those gifts.
Hence, there are clear, systematic sex differences when it comes to charitable giving.
How are these differences resolved within a marriage? Our findings argue against the hypothesis that a married couple behaves as if governed by a single utility function and are more consistent with a model of household bargaining.
We also find that decision making over charitable giving is reasonably interpreted as a privilege as well as a task, and that when a particular spouse has sole control the decisions seem to reflect his or her own tastes. But when decisions are made jointly, we find that the "compromise" achieves about 68 percent of the male preference and only 26 percent of the female preference. The sum of these weights is significantly less than one, suggesting that the costliness of bargaining reduces giving on average by six percent.
Although the marital bargain on charity mostly favors men when it comes to total giving, when women do become the deciders we find that they wield their power to influence the disbursement of the family's charity. By contrast to men, women tend to give to a greater variety of charitable activities, giving less to each. Women especially favor health and education, while men are more generous than women only within the sphere of adult recreation.
Finally, how does the couple select who will take the task of being the charitable decision maker? Our analysis finds an important simultaneity between the household choice of primary wage earner and decision maker on charity-unobserved variables seem to devolve the two roles onto the same spouse.
An important aspect of our results is that they provide direct evidence to support the growing feeling among fund-raisers that men and women behave very differently with respect to charitable giving. Men are more sensitive to both price and income, for instance, and tend to concentrate their giving among fewer kinds of charities. And when the price of giving is low, men tend to give more to charity than women, but when the price is high the opposite is true.
In sum, by looking at the family as a complicated institution our analysis reveals a rich and complex set of relationships between gender, economic status, tastes for charity, and bargaining strength. Further exploration into charity as well as other household public goods could prove to be an exciting frontier for further economic research. These probabilities are constructed from estimating probit models where the dependent variable is whether the household gave to the specific charity type. The probabilities estimates are the predicted probability for a white, church-going 45-year old, family of 3 with ln(income) =10.59125 and price of charity = .85 in 1992. The male is 45 years-old. The female is 43 years-old. Both the male and female have high school degrees. Also, no male givers with only a high school degree gave to foreign charities. The prediction in the case of foreign charities was done for males and females who attended college. Test statistics are distributed χ 2 (1) under the null-hypothesis that the predictions are equal. * statistically significant at 10% level. ** statistically significant at 5% level. 2177 observations. Log-Likelihood -2527.079
Note: The predicted probabilities are for a church going family of 3 that includes a 45-year old, high school graduate, white male and a 43-year old, high school graduate, white female. Female being the primary giver is the base category.
(standard errors in parentheses) *estimate is significant at a 5% level. Gives to Charity Indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent has given to at least one of the twelve charity categories in the previous calendar year and 0 otherwise.
Total Contributions
The sum of the amount of money the respondent has reported giving to each of the twelve charity groups in the previous calendar year, expressed in 1993 dollars.
Price Equals one minus the marginal tax rate for itemizers, and one for non-itemizers. Tax rates are calculated from information on income, itemization status, and other key variables.
Income
Respondents reported income in one of 13 before-tax income ranges. We use the midpoint of the range to which they belong as the income measure, in 1993 dollars. For those who report earning less than $7000 we use $5000 and for those who report earning more than $100000 we use $125000. 
